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  We describe a variety of perspectives on corporate social responsibility (CSR), which we 
use to develop a framework for consideration of the strategic implications of CSR.  Based on this 
framework, we propose an agenda for additional theoretical and empirical research on CSR.  We 
then review the papers in this special issue and relate them to the proposed agenda.  
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INTRODUTION 
 
  In recent years, scholars and managers have devoted greater attention to the strategic 
implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Consistent with McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001), we define CSR as situations where the firm goes beyond compliance and engages in 
“actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which 
is required by law.”  However, this is just one interpretation of CSR.  Numerous definitions of 
CSR have been proposed and often no clear definition is given, making theoretical development 
and measurement difficult.  CSR activities have been posited to include incorporating social 
characteristics or features into products and manufacturing processes (e.g., aerosol products with 
no fluorocarbons or using environmentally-friendly technologies), adopting progressive human 
resource management practices (e.g., promoting employee empowerment), achieving higher 
levels of environmental performance through recycling and pollution abatement (e.g., adopting 
an aggressive stance towards reducing emissions), and advancing the goals of community 
organizations (e.g., working closely with groups such as United Way).  Researchers are moving 
beyond just defining and identifying CSR activities, to examine the strategic role of CSR in 
organizations.      
  Similarly, there is growing interest among managers in the antecedents and consequences 
of CSR, especially for executives at multi-national, multi-divisional companies.  These corporate 
leaders are mindful of the fact that business norms and standards, regulatory frameworks, and 
stakeholder demand for CSR can vary substantially across nations, regions, and lines of business.  
They are also aware that their divisional managers are under constant pressure from employees, 
suppliers, community groups, NGOs, and government to increase their involvement in CSR.    4 
  Unfortunately for both academicians and practitioners, the analysis of CSR is still 
embryonic and thus, theoretical frameworks, measurement, and empirical methods have not yet 
been resolved.  Furthermore, this topic cannot be analyzed through the lens of a single 
disciplinary perspective.  Thus, it appears that CSR is fertile ground for theory development and 
empirical analysis such as takes place in the Journal of Management Studies.   
  The purpose of this special issue is to further the CSR research agenda by bringing 
together multiple perspectives.   After issuing an open call for papers on the Academy of 
Management website and other venues, we received numerous manuscripts.  We reviewed these 
papers and selected several for presentation at a Special Issue Workshop at the University of 
Illinois at Chicago.
1  Among the authors and discussants at the workshop were scholars from 
several academic disciplines (management, political science, accounting, marketing, and 
economics), many international contributors, and a high proportion of junior scholars.  
  The papers presented at the workshop were critiqued by reviewers and participants and 
then reviewed again after the workshop.  From these revised manuscripts, we selected the five 
best for publication in the special issue.  Several themes emerged from these studies: the relation 
between CSR and competitive advantage, the role of differences in institutional environments in 
framing stakeholder expectations regarding the propensity of firms to engage in CSR, a 
comparison of the social desirability of the strategic use of CSR versus “coerced” CSR, the role 
of economic, philosophical, and global corporate citizenship perspectives on CSR, and the 
evolution and influence of the academic literature on CSR.    
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss a 
variety of theories that shed light on the strategic implications of CSR.  Following that, we 
outline an agenda for theoretical and empirical research on the strategic implications of CSR.    5 
We conclude with a brief review of each study in the special issue and its importance to our 
proposed research agenda.   
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CSR  
  Numerous theories have been brought to bear on the subject of CSR.  We summarize 
selected articles on theoretical perspectives in Table 1.  Theodore Levitt could be credited with 
setting the agenda for the debate about the social responsibility of business in his HBR article 
“The Dangers of Social Responsibility,” in which he cautions that “government’s job is not 
business, and business’s job is not government” (1958, p. 47).  Milton Friedman (1970) 
expressed the same sentiment and added that the mere existence of CSR was a signal of an 
agency problem within the firm.  An agency theory perspective implies that CSR is a misuse of 
corporate resources that would be better spent on valued-added internal projects or returned to 
shareholders.  It also suggests that CSR is an executive perk, in the sense that managers use CSR 
to advance their careers or other personal agendas.  
  R. Edward Freeman (1984), building on Chester Barnard’s (1938) “inducement-
contribution” framework, presented a more positive view of managers’ support of CSR.  
Freeman’s stakeholder theory asserts that managers must satisfy a variety of constituents (e.g., 
workers, customers, suppliers, local community organizations) who can influence firm outcomes.  
According to this view, it is not sufficient for managers to focus exclusively on the needs of 
stockholders, or the owners the corporation.  Stakeholder theory implies that it can be beneficial 
for the firm to engage in certain CSR activities that non-financial stakeholders perceive to be 
important, because, absent this, these groups might withdraw their support for the firm.  
Stakeholder theory was expanded by Donaldson and Preston (1995) who stressed the moral and 
ethical dimensions of CSR, as well as the business case for engaging in such activity.  Another   6 
perspective, stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990) is based on the idea that there is a moral 
imperative for managers to “do the right thing,” without regard to how such decisions affect firm 
financial performance.   
  Institutional theory and classical economic theory have also been applied to CSR in a 
paper by Jones (1995).  The author concludes that companies involved in repeated transactions 
with stakeholders on the basis of trust and cooperation are motivated to be honest, trustworthy, 
and ethical because the returns to such behavior are high.  Institutional approaches have also 
been used to analyze environmental social responsibility.  More specifically, Jennings and 
Zandbergen (1995) analyze the role of institutions in shaping the consensus within a firm 
regarding the establishment of an “ecologically sustainable” organization.  Finally, a recent 
paper by Waldman, Siegel, and Javidan (2005) applies strategic leadership theory to CSR.  These 
authors conjecture that certain aspects of transformational leadership will be positively correlated 
with the propensity of firms to engage in CSR and that these leaders will employ CSR activities 
strategically.  
  To the extent that firms engage in CSR strategically, this behavior can be examined 
through the lens of the resource-based-view-of-the-firm (RBV).  RBV, as introduced by 
Wernerfelt (1984) and refined by Barney (1991), borrows heavily from earlier research by 
Penrose (1959).  This theory presumes that firms are bundles of heterogeneous resources and 
capabilities that are imperfectly mobile across firms.  Barney (1991) maintains that if these 
resources and capabilities are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable, they can constitute 
a source of sustainable competitive advantage.   
  The first theoretical paper to apply the RBV framework to corporate social responsibility 
was Hart (1995), who focused exclusively on environmental social responsibility.  Hart asserted   7 
that, for certain types of firms, environmental social responsibility can constitute a resource or 
capability that leads to a sustained competitive advantage.  Russo and Fouts (1997) tested this 
theory empirically using firm-level data on environmental and accounting profitability and found 
that firms with higher levels of environmental performance had superior financial performance, 
which they interpreted to be consistent with the RBV theory.   
  Using the RBV framework, a more formal theory-of-the-firm model of “profit-
maximizing” CSR was posited in McWilliams and Siegel (2001).  These authors outlined a 
simple model in which two companies produce identical products, except that one firm adds an 
additional “social” attribute or feature to the product, which is valued by some consumers or, 
potentially, by other stakeholders.  In this model, managers conduct a cost/benefit analysis to 
determine the level of resources to devote to CSR activities/attributes.  That is, they assess the 
demand for CSR and also evaluate the cost of satisfying this demand.  
  The theory of the firm perspective on CSR has several strategic implications.  The first is 
that CSR can be an integral element of a firm’s business and corporate-level differentiation 
strategies.  Therefore, it should be considered as a form of strategic investment.  Even when it is 
not directly tied to a product feature or production process, CSR can be viewed as a form of 
reputation building or maintenance.  A second strategic implication of a theory of the firm 
perspective is that one can apply the RBV logic to CSR, in the sense that it is possible to 
generate a set of predictions regarding patterns of investment in CSR across firms and industries.  
For example, we expect to observe a positive correlation between CSR and both R&D and 
advertising (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000).  Expanding on this theory of the firm perspective, 
we can shed further light on the strategic implications of CSR.   In particular, we wish to focus   8 
on issues relating to industry evolution, market structure, firm dynamics, and the role of 
asymmetric information in the context of CSR. 
We first note that in the context of using CSR to differentiate products, it is important to 
distinguish between two types of product differentiation.  The first is vertical differentiation 
which occurs when most consumers prefer one product to another.  Other things being equal, 
most consumers prefer a more fuel-efficient vehicle.  In the context of CSR, such a situation 
could occur when it is clear in the mind of consumers that the product with a CSR characteristic 
is better than the product without such a characteristic.  For example, a “hybrid” version of a 
Honda Accord generates less pollution than a standard Honda Accord.  Thus, it is clear to most 
consumers that the hybrid car is better than the standard model.  Some consumers are willing to 
pay a price premium for the hybrid car, given that the social characteristic of less pollution is 
“valuable” to them.  This type of differentiation can strengthen or maintain the reputation of the 
firm which adds value in addition to allowing the firm to meet a particular market demand 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).  
In contrast, horizontal differentiation occurs when only some consumers prefer a 
particular product, but the preference is based on taste, rather than quality.  For example, some 
consumers choose a particular vehicle because of the color.  This type of differentiation does not 
contribute to the reputation of the firm and does not allow the firm to charge a premium price. 
Horizontal differentiation also operates for different brands.  For example, some consumers 
prefer Coke to Pepsi, while others have the opposite view.    
In contrast to the ease of valuing CSR attributes, consumers often find it difficult to 
determine if a firm’s internal operations meet their moral and political standards for socially 
responsibility.  The level of asymmetric information regarding internal operations can be   9 
mediated by the firm itself or by activists.  For instance, companies such as McDonalds, 
Motorola, and Nike publish annual reports on social responsibility.  One can view this activity as 
a form of advertising, especially for more general types of CSR.   While such reports may be 
useful, some consumers perceive this information as biased, since it is filtered through senior 
management.  Fedderson & Gilligan (2001) assert that activists can play an important role in 
addressing this concern, by supplying consumers with information they can rely on to choose 
socially responsible firms.   
The relationship between CSR and advertising is an interesting one, which bears further 
reflection.  Several stylized facts relating to industry evolution and the nature of advertising are 
useful to consider.  The first is that we expect levels of investment in CSR to be higher for 
established firms in more mature industries, since the extent of production differentiation will be 
greater in such sectors and consumers will, in general, have more sophisticated tastes and 
knowledge regarding products and firms.  It is clear that such companies are likely to derive 
greater benefits from the use of CSR for reputation enhancement/protection.  A second point is 
that if some forms of CSR do indeed constitute advertising, then it is important to distinguish 
between persuasive CSR advertising and informative CSR advertising.  Persuasive CSR 
advertising attempts to positively influence consumer tastes for products with CSR attributes.  It 
follows that this type of advertising need not be firm-specific.  Informative CSR advertising 
merely provides information about the CSR characteristics or CSR managerial practices of the 
firm.  Following Milgrom and Roberts (1986), one could also view a high level of CSR 
advertising (either persuasive on informative CSR advertising) as a signal of product or firm 
quality.   10 
Another critical issue concerns the nature of the market structure of the firm’s industry.  
A key conclusion of the McWilliams and Siegel (2001) paper was that, in equilibrium, firms that 
engage in CSR will earn the same rate of profit as firms that do not engage in CSR.  We refer to 
this finding as the neutrality result.  This finding was misinterpreted by Piga (2002) as implying 
that CSR can only occur in monopolistically competitive industries, since some oligopoly 
models of vertically differentiated markets predict that (in equilibrium) firms selling the higher 
quality product (in our case, the firm that sells a good with a CSR characteristic) reap 
“abnormal” profits.   
We believe that the neutrality result holds under both oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition.  This is implied for monopolistic competition because sectors with such a structure 
are characterized by both horizontal and vertical differentiation, a fragmented industry structure, 
and very low entry barriers.  Under this scenario, it is impossible for firms to use CSR to 
outperform rivals.  Examples of firms in monopolistically competitive industries that engage in 
CSR include restaurants, hotels, companies selling organic produce, and different types of retail 
establishments.   
  The neutrality result likely holds for monopolistic markets as well.  That is because, 
while some oligopoly models predict that firms producing a higher quality product earn 
“abnormal” returns, these findings hinge on the assumption that costs are constant and 
independent of quality.  These assumptions were not invoked in the McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001) model.  Furthermore, recent economic models of CSR (Baron, 2001; Fedderson & 
Gilligan, 2001) identify an important countervailing force on the ability of companies to engage 
in strategic CSR in oligopolistic industries: activists who target leading firms (e.g., the attack on   11 
Nike’s Asian production).  This countervailing force makes it difficult for oligopolistic firms to 
achieve a competitive advantage through the strategic use of CSR.   
  The question of whether firms can use CSR to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage is another important question.  A paper by Reinhardt (1998) finds that a firm engaging 
in a CSR-based strategy can only generate an abnormal return if it can prevent competitors from 
imitating its strategy.  In competitive markets this is unlikely, since CSR is highly transparent, 
with little causal ambiguity.  Other theoretical studies (Dutta, Lach & Rustichini, 1995; Hoppe & 
Lehmann-Grube, 2001) show that any early mover advantages that might be gained by offering 
higher quality products (recall that CSR is modeled as a “quality improvement” in McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001) are eroded when competitive strategies are observable.   
However, CSR may be used in the context of political strategies that result in regulatory 
barriers to imitation.   One such strategy would be for firms to be use government regulation to 
impose CSR on rivals who do not employ an appropriate technology, thus raising the costs of 
those rivals relative to the initiating firm.  Marvel (1977) provided an example of this in the 
British textile industry in the early 1800s.  The first child labor law was passed in Great Britain 
after the mill owners who employed modern technology banded together and lobbied for 
restrictions on child labor, which was used more by the older, smaller mills.  McWilliams, Van 
Fleet, and Cory (2002) applied the RBV framework to demonstrate how U.S. firms can use 
political strategies based on CSR to raise regulatory barriers that prevent foreign competitors 
from using substitute (e.g., low labor cost) technology. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------   12 
This discussion focused primarily on understanding CSR from an applied perspective. 
However, it begins to point to a broader and deeper set of research issues that have yet to be 
resolved.   
RESEARCH AGENDA ON THE STRATEGIC IPLICATIONS OF CSR 
  There are numerous unresolved theoretical and empirical issues relating to the strategic 
implications of CSR.  These include defining CSR, identifying institutional differences in CSR 
across countries, determining the motivations for CSR, describing CSR strategies, modeling the 
effects of CSR on the firm and stakeholder groups, determining the effects of leadership and 
corporate culture on CSR activity, assessing the effect of CSR on the firm and stakeholder 
groups, measuring the demand for CSR, measuring the costs of CSR and assessing the current 
knowledge base.    
Theoretical issues to be resolved  
As noted in our introduction, there is a no strong consensus on a definition for CSR.  
CSR has been used as a synonym for business ethics, defined as tantamount to corporate 
philanthropy, and considered strictly as relating to environmental policy.  CSR has also been 
confused with corporate social performance and corporate citizenship.  The lack of consistency 
in the use of the term CSR makes it difficult to compare results across studies, hampering our 
ability to understand the implications of CSR activity.  As other issues are resolved, we hope that 
they lead to the emergence of an agreed-upon definition of CSR. 
  Having a good definition of CSR, with a common terminology, would aid us in modeling 
the role organizational culture and leadership in determining the importance of CSR within an 
organization.  Researchers could analyze how changes in corporate control, particularly through 
merger or acquisition, affect the type and level of CSR activity within firms.  Alternatively,   13 
changes in top management (CEO or team) might be examined to determine whether leadership 
style and characteristics are more important than corporate control/culture for predicting CSR 
activity.  Understanding the role of leadership could be extended to understanding the decision 
making process and how decisions about CSR activity are affected by demands from multiple 
stakeholders.      
  Asymmetric information makes it difficult to study the antecedents and consequences of 
CSR.  Managers may perceive that many external stakeholders view CSR activity more 
favorably if it is divorced from any discussion of the bottom line.  With this in mind, managers 
may not reveal the more practical motivations (such as product promotion, labor cost control and 
reputation building) behind their CSR activities, especially in corporate publications such as 
annual reports.  This lack of candid information has made it difficult to distinguish and discuss 
the different motivations for CSR, which may be private or social.   
  The use of CSR to capture value is referred to as strategic CSR by Baron (2001) who 
points out that “it is the motivation for the action that identifies socially, as opposed to privately, 
responsible action.”  That is, if the motivation is to serve society, at the cost of profits, the action 
is socially responsible, but if the motivation is to serve the bottom line, then the action is 
privately responsible.  For privately responsible actions, there may well be social benefits that 
exceed the cost of the action to the firm.  However, this does not change the motivation, unless 
these social benefits are of value to managers.  For example, providing day care may lower the 
number of juvenile crimes in a community, but the firm might provide the day care only because 
it increases the availability of workers and lowers the cost of absenteeism.   
  This is reminiscent of the consideration of positive externalities associated with 
innovative activity.  An externality is defined as the impact of an economic agent’s actions on   14 
the well-being of a bystander.  Pollution is a classic example of a negative externality, while 
innovation (whose benefits cannot be entirely appropriated by its creator) is a classic example of 
a positive externality.   While the private returns to innovation (or those that accrue to the 
company) may be high, the social returns to innovation (through the creation of new or improved 
products and processes) may be even greater.  Researchers need to use more direct methods, 
such as interviews and surveys, to “tease out” less self-serving information about the motivations 
for CSR activity and improve the precision of measurement of the private and social returns to 
CSE. 
  In addition to understanding the motivation for the provision of social benefits, we need 
to understand how the provision of these goods, through strategic CSR, affects society.  An 
example of strategic CSR is when a firm links the provision of a public good to the sale of their 
(private) products (e.g., eco-labeling).  Bagnoli and Watts (2003) model this behavior and find 
that propensity of firms to engage in strategic CSR depends on two factors: the intensity of 
competition in the market and the extent to which consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
social responsibility.  The authors conclude that there is an inverse relation between intensity of 
competition and provision of CSR.  That is, in more competitive markets, less of the public good 
will be provided through strategic CSR.  Conversely, the less competitive the market, the more 
of the public good will be provided.  This is easy to understand, since more competition results 
in lower margins and, therefore, less ability to provide additional (social) attributes or activity.  
Conversely, less competition leads to the potential for higher margins and more ability to provide 
additional attributes or activity.  
  An analysis of the provision of public goods by private firms is a welcome addition to the 
management literature on CSR, which has been primarily concerned with answering the   15 
following question: do firms “do well by doing good”?  Showing that a firm does well by doing 
good is often referred to as making the business case for CSR.  While understanding the relation 
between firm performance and social performance is of primary importance in the management 
literature, a more thorough understanding of the CSR phenomenon requires that we take account 
of other stakeholders as well.  These stakeholders include: customers, employees, governments, 
suppliers, taxpayers, community groups, and underrepresented groups.   
  Our understanding of CSR should be extended to an examination of the strategic use of 
CSR activities.  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) established that investing in CSR attributes and 
activities may be important elements of product differentiation and reputation building.  
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) suggest that CSR activities be included in strategy formulation 
and that the level of resources devoted to CSR be determined through cost/benefit analysis.   
   Analysis of the strategic implications of CSR is hampered by cross-country/cultural 
differences in the institutions that regulate market activity, including business, labor and social 
agencies.  Institutional differences lead to different expectations and different returns to activity.  
For firms operating in multiple countries/cultures this complicates the process of determining 
which activities to engage in and how much to invest.  As the knowledge base of CSR develops 
world-wide, we will be better able to analyze and advise on CSR.  
  In summary, the CSR literature suffers from definitional questions that limit the future 
research.  Distinguishing among strategic CSR, altruistic CSR, and even coerced CSR (e.g., 
Husted & De Jesus Salazar, this issue) constitutes a significant theoretical breakthrough. 
However, until theory and research can adequately agree upon what, specifically, constitutes 
CSR, research will continue to provide a lack of consistent results.  It is to this empirical research 
that we next turn our attention.    16 
 
Empirical issues to be resolved 
Problems with measurement of the costs and benefits of CSR activities continue to cloud 
our understanding of the strategic implications of CSR.  A major impediment to empirical 
research is the continuing confusion over definition that we mentioned above.  It is impossible to 
measure what we cannot define and, as long as we use different definitions, we will get empirical 
results that cannot reliably be compared.  Table 2 presents selected empirical studies of CSR. 
   
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Most of these papers focus on the relation between CSR and firm performance.  Early 
studies used either the event study methodology (which is based on analysis of short-run changes 
in stock prices as a proxy for firm performance in the aftermath of a CSR-related event) or 
regression analysis (which uses an accounting measure of profitability, such as return on assets, 
as the dependent variable in a regression model that “explains” firm performance).  These studies 
usually attempted to answer the question: do firms do well by doing good?  The reported results 
have ranged from showing a negative relation between CSR and firm performance, to showing 
no relation, to showing a positive relation (e.g. the results of divesting from South Africa shown 
in Table 2).  There is little consistency in these findings.  This may be a result of inconsistency in 
defining CSR, inconsistency in defining firm performance, inconsistency in samples, imprecision 
and inconsistency in research design, misspecification of models, changes over time, or some 
more fundamental variance in the samples that are being analyzed.    17 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) critiqued the use of the event study methodology to 
measure the consequences of CSR.  The authors reported that the findings of event studies of 
CSR appearing in top management journals were unreliable, due to serious flaws in the research 
design and implementation of the event study methodology (see also McWilliams, Siegel, & 
Teoh, 1999).  They also cautioned that the use of stock price as a metric for performance is not 
appropriate for studying CSR.  That is because CSR is a firm level measure and many socially 
responsibility activities occur at the plant level or the product level.  Another concern is that an 
analysis of stock price effects only relates to financial stakeholders and it is clear that non-
financial stakeholders are also affected by CSR activities.   
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) challenged the conventional regression model used to 
assess the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP), which is often used as a 
synonym for CSR, and firm performance.  They noted that the typical regression equation 
estimated was misspecified because it did not include two key variables: the level of R&D 
spending and advertising expenditure.  Both of these variables have been shown to be 
determinants of firm performance and, because all three (R&D, advertising, and CSP) are 
elements of a differentiation strategy, they hypothesized that R&D and advertising would be 
correlated with a measure of CSP.  The results of McWilliams & Siegel’s estimation of the 
correctly-specified, expanded equation demonstrated that the three explanatory variables were 
correlated.  Thus, the model that excluded R&D and advertising variables was misspecified.  
Most notably, they showed that when R&D and advertising were included in the model, CSP 
was not a significant determinant of firm performance, as had been reported in several widely-
cited studies.      18 
Consistent with Baron’s (2001) distinction between altruistic CSR and strategic CSR, 
Hillman and Keim (2001) conjecture that empirical tests of the relation between CSR and firm 
performance should disaggregate CSR activities into those that are strategic (stakeholder 
management) and those that are altruistic (social issue participation).  Based on estimation of a 
disaggregated model, they report that there is a positive relation between firm performance 
(measured using market value added) and strategic CSR and a negative relation between 
altruistic CSR and firm performance.   
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) provide a framework for analyzing CSR within the 
context of the theory of the firm.  Based on this framework, they develop hypotheses regarding 
the provision of CSR attributes across industries and market structures.  They hypothesize that 
“the provision of CSR will depend on R&D spending, advertising intensity, the extent of product 
differentiation, the percentage of government sales, consumer income, the tightness of the labor 
market, and the stage of the industry life cycle” (2001, p. 125).  All of these should be tested 
empirically to see if the results support the hypotheses. 
McWilliams and Siegel conclude that “there is some level of CSR that will maximize 
profits while satisfying the demand for CSR from multiple stakeholders.  The ideal level of CSR 
can be determined by cost-benefit analysis” (2001, p. 125).  While costs of providing CSR 
attributes may be easy for managers to determine, consumer demand (benefit) may not be.  
Consumer demand for CSR could be difficult to measure because CSR attributes are among 
many attributes of a product.  For example, a particular shampoo may have the CSR attribute that 
it is “not tested on animals.”  But, it also has a particular scent, color, consistency, and package.  
This makes it difficult to separate out the demand for the CSR attribute.   19 
A method for assessing how much consumers are willing to pay for a given product 
characteristic or feature is hedonic pricing.  Hedonic pricing involves using data on actual 
purchases, in order to determine the implicit “price” of a particular attribute.  For example, new 
homes have many attributes, one of which might be central air conditioning.  Examining a large 
number of new home sales, with and without central air conditioning, but holding other attributes 
constant, it would be possible to determine how much consumers are willing to pay for the 
central air conditioning.  Similarly, to determine the “demand” for “not tested on animals,” 
researchers can compare sale data on many shampoos, with and without the CSR attribute and 
can determine how much consumers will pay for that attribute.  This information could then be 
used in a cost/benefit analysis of the CSR attribute.   
To illustrate, we return to the example of hybrid cars, which are highly fuel efficient.  
Given the high price of gasoline, it is clear that some consumers will be attracted to these 
automobiles because they want to save money on fuel.  Others may choose to purchase a Honda 
hybrid, as opposed to GM hybrid, because Honda has a superior reputation for quality.  Still 
others are willing to pay a price premium for the hybrid car, strictly because the social 
characteristic of less pollution is “valuable” to them.  The beauty of the hedonic method is that it 
allows us tease out the value to the consumer of each of these three factors (fuel efficiency, 
quality differential, and the social characteristic of less pollution).   
The hedonic method is based on the notion that the (logarithm of the) price of a good or 
service is related to its characteristics or features as follows:  
                                     K    
         ln PRICE= β0  +  Σ  βk Zk  + εi 
                                   k=1                                  
   20 
where ε is a random error term and Z is a vector of k characteristics or attributes.  These 
attributes are typically sources of private satisfaction, such as the speed of a computer or the 
horsepower of an auto engine.  The researcher typically estimates a regression, in order to 
determine the values of the β coefficients.  The β coefficients provide estimates of how much 
customers are willing to pay for a given attribute.  
  Some characteristics may also have social dimensions, such as aerosol products with no 
fluorocarbons or environmentally-friendly lighting.  A major advantage of hedonics, relative to 
other methods (e.g. focus groups), is that it is based on observed, not hypothetical data.  
Hedonics have been used by government agencies and other researchers to “price” individual 
attributes of computers, autos, housing, land, and dowries.  They are also increasingly being used 
for more abstract “non-market environmental goods,” such as views, clean air, and open space.  
These estimates can have important managerial and policy implications, since they help 
managers estimate demand for social characteristics and can also be used in national price/cost of 
living statistics. 
  The theoretical and empirical issues discussed above provide an important foundation for 
understanding the contributions of the articles in this special issue.  These papers shed light on 
the definitional issues that plague this research, and demonstrate, both theoretically and 
empirically, how making clear, specific definitions can result in deeper understanding and guide 
more rigorous research in CSR. 
 
PAPERS IN THE SPECIAL ISSUE  
The article by Alfie Marcus and Marc Anderson poses an interesting research question, 
especially in light of our previous discussion of the strategic implications of CSR.  The authors   21 
ask whether a firm’s “dynamic capability” influences its competence in CSR.  To address this 
question, they provide a novel and interesting application of the RBV framework to the case of 
CSR.   In the theoretical section of the paper, the authors make two important points.  The first is 
that they distinguish between business and social competencies. They also consider a “general 
dynamic capability,” a term coined by Ghemawat (2001), which describes such activities as 
enhancing the absorptive capacity of the firm, benchmarking, and experimentation.   
The authors examine their research question using a detailed firm-level survey in the U.S. 
retail food industry.  Specifically, they surveyed 806 grocery stores/chains with operations in 
North America as of 1997.  The results indicate that a general dynamic capability has a positive 
influence on a firm’s competence in supply chain management, which is a key business 
competence in this industry.  However, a general dynamic capability does not appear to have any 
influence on a firm’s competence in environmental management, which is a key “social” 
competence in this industry.  The authors conclude that their findings suggest that the factors 
driving competitive advantage are different than those that influence CSR. 
Jonathan Doh and Terrence Guay assess the role of differences in the institutional 
environments of Europe and the U.S. in explaining expectations regarding the propensity of 
firms to be socially responsible.  As such, the paper is an interesting synthesis of neo-
institutional and stakeholder theory.  It is a qualitative analysis, consisting of three case studies.  
Specifically, the authors assess the roles that U.S. and European nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) have played in influencing CSR policies in three areas: the trade and regulation of 
genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), pharmaceutical pricing and distribution policies, and 
international environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol Treaty.   22 
The case studies reveal the role of institutional differences in these two regions in 
influencing government policy, corporate strategy and NGO activism related to CSR.  
Specifically, the authors find that these factors play an important role in determining how CSR is 
perceived and implemented in the U.S. and Europe.  A key implication of the Doh and Guay 
study is that any cross-country comparison of the propensity of firms to engage in CSR should 
take into account these institutional differences.   
  In the next article, Bryan Husted and Jose de Jesus Salazar pose another interesting 
research question: is it better for firms to act strategically with respect to CSR than to be coerced 
into making such investments?  More generally, the authors analyze the conditions under which 
firms can maximize profit and enhance social performance.  As such, they take the theory of the 
firm perspective on CSR seriously, since they conduct a cost/benefit analysis of social 
responsibility.  This technique was proposed in by McWilliams and Siegel (2001).  
  Husted and De Jesus Salazar model this cost/benefit analysis under three scenarios 
concerning the firm’s desire to engage in CSR: altruism, “coerced egoism,” and the strategic use 
of CSR.  Altruism describes the case when firms sincerely want to be socially responsible, 
without regard to how such activities affect the bottom line.  Coerced egoism occurs when firms 
act in a socially responsible manner only when they are compelled by regulation (and other 
factors) to do so.  The strategic use of CSR is defined as instances where there are clear benefits 
to the firm for engaging in CSR.  
  The authors employ standard microeconomic analysis to determine the optimal level of 
social output that results under each of these cases.  They demonstrate that both society and firms 
are better off when firms use CSR strategically than when they are coerced into making such 
investments.  This is a conclusion that would make Adam Smith smile.     23 
  In the next paper, Duane Windsor examines different perspectives on CSR.  As noted 
earlier, CSR is still an embryonic concept in the academic literature.  Windsor’s essay is a tour-
de-force on the evolution on three opposing perspectives on CSR: economic, philosophical, and 
global corporate citizenship.  As he defines it, the economic viewpoint focuses on the firm’s 
ability to use CSR as a tool to create wealth, implies minimal government intervention to 
promote CSR, and advocates that the firm adopt prevailing business ethics.  On the other hand, 
the philosophical perspective results in moral reflection on CSR and should lead to higher levels 
of CSR and other forms of altruism.  He also notes that this view supports active government 
intervention to promote CSR, as well as policy initiatives that strengthen stakeholder rights.  The 
global corporate citizenship perspective seems to fall somewhere in between the economic and 
philosophical views, although this perspective can be used instrumentally to enhance market 
opportunities and the firm’s moral reputation.  The author concludes by discussing the 
implications of each of these perspectives for CSR scholarship.  
  This special issue concludes with an article by Andy Lockett, Jeremy Moon, and Duane 
Visser, which assesses the status of CSR research in the management literature.  Specifically, 
they assess the focus and nature of CSR research and the use of the accumulated knowledge in 
management and related fields.  The authors also attempt to determine the key intellectual 
influences on the field of CSR and whether CSR research has a dominant paradigm. 
  Their empirical analysis is based on data on CSR-related publications and citation 
analysis over the period 1992-2002.  The authors identified CSR-related articles in the following 
journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Organization Science, Strategic Management 
Journal, Journal of Management Studies, Harvard Business Review, Sloan Management Review,   24 
and California Management Review.  They analyzed both the articles cited in these CSR-related 
papers and the citations that CSR-related articles generated in other journals.    
   They found that the “field” is in a “continuing state of emergence,” a term coined by 
Thomas Kuhn (1972).  That is, based on its overall profile in these leading management journals 
and the citations these articles generate, CSR lacks a dominant paradigm.  This is an obvious call 
to action for concerned researchers.  
  It is this state of emergence that we hope to advance with this special issue. The papers 
here exemplify the variety of perspectives that have been brought to bear on CSR. They also 
demonstrate an increasing ability to clearly define the construct of CSR (albeit not necessarily all 
agreeing on the definition) and build strong theoretical arguments and high-quality empirical 
studies that will provide an effective springboard for future research in CSR.   25 
Table 1:  











Friedman (1970)   Agency Theory   CSR is indicative of self-serving behavior on the part of 
managers, and thus, reduces shareholder wealth.     
Freeman (1984)   Stakeholder Theory   Managers should tailor their policies to satisfy numerous 
constituents, not just shareholders.  These stakeholders include 
workers, customers, suppliers, and community organizations. 
Donaldson (1990)  Stewardship Theory  There is a moral imperative for managers to “do the right thing,” 
without regard to how such decisions affect firm performance. 
Donaldson and 
Preston (1995)  
Stakeholder Theory   Stressed the moral and ethical dimensions of stakeholder theory, 
as well as the business case for engaging in CSR.   
Jones (1995)   Stakeholder Theory   Firms involved in repeated transactions with stakeholders on the 
basis of trust and cooperation have an incentive to be honest and 
ethical, since such behavior is beneficial to the firm. 
Hart (1995)   Resource-Based View 
of the Firm  
For certain companies, environmental social responsibility can 
constitute a resource or capability that leads to a sustained 
competitive advantage. 
Jennings and 
Zandbergen (1995)  
Institutional Theory   Institutions play an important role in shaping the consensus 
within a firm regarding the establishment of an “ecologically 
sustainable” organization 
Baron (2001)  Theory of the Firm  The use of CSR to attract socially responsible consumers is 
referred to as strategic CSR, in the sense that firms provide a 
public good in conjunction with their marketing/business strategy 
Feddersen and 
Gilligan (2001) 
Theory of the Firm  Activists and NGOs can play an important role in reducing 
information asymmetry with respect to CSR  
on the part of consumers. 
McWilliams and 
Siegel (2001) 
Theory of the Firm   Presents a supply/demand perspective on CSR, which implies 
that the firm’s ideal level of CSR can be determined by cost-
benefit analysis.   
McWilliams, Van 
Fleet and Cory 
(2002) 
Resource-Based View 
of the Firm 
CSR strategies, when supported by political strategies, can be 
used to create sustainable competitive advantage. 
Waldman, Siegel, 
and Javidan (2005)  
Theory of the Firm/ 
Strategic Leadership 
Theory    
Certain aspects of CEO leadership can affect the propensity of 
firms to engage in CSR.  Companies run by intellectually 
stimulating CEOs do more strategic CSR than comparable firms   
   26 
Table 2:  
 Selected Empirical Papers on CSR  
 




and Hannon (1990) 
Event Study  Human Resource 
Decisions 
No consistent pattern of increased or 
decreased stock price 
Worrell, Davidson 
and Sharma (1991) 
Event Study  Layoff Programs  Investors react negatively to layoff  
announcements, especially when they 
are due to financial distress 
Clinebell and 
Clinebell (1994) 
Event Study  Plant Closures  Longer periods of advance notice of 
plant closings result in greater losses in 
shareholder wealth  
Posnikoff (1997)   Event Study  Divestment From 
South Africa 
Divestment enhanced shareholder  
value 
Wright and Ferris, 
(1997) 
Event Study  Divestment From 
South Africa 
Divestment had a negative effect on 
shareholder value 
Teoh, Welch, and 
Wazzan (1999) 
Event Study  Divestment From 
South Africa 
Divestment had a neutral effect on 
shareholder value 
Aupperle, Carroll, and 
Hatfield (1985) 
Regression Analysis  An Overall Firm-Level 
Index of CSR 





Regression Analysis  An Overall Firm-Level 
Index of CSR 
Prior profitability was more closely 
related to CSR than was subsequent 
performance 
Russo and Fouts 
(1997) 
Regression Analysis  Environmental 
Performance 
There is a positive relation between 
environmental performance and 
financial performance 
Waddock and Graves 
(1997)  
Regression Analysis  An Overall Firm-Level 
Index of CSR –KLD 
Data 




Regression Analysis  An Overall Firm-Level 
Index of CSR–KLD 
Data 
There is a neutral relation between CSR 
and profitability 
Hillman and Keim 
(2001)  




“Stakeholder Management” CSR is 
positively correlated with shareholder 
wealth creation (market value added); 
“Social Issues” CSR is not 
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